Disbelieved Beliefs: Subjective Estimates of Bias in Probabilistic Beliefs And Their Relationships to Desire

It has often been argued or assumed that it is impossible to simultaneously have a belief and disbelieve that belief, or view it as biased in a specific direction. In three studies we asked people what they believed were the probabilities of various outcomes varying in desirability, and then asked them what they would believe if they thought (a) in the way they would ideally like themselves and others to think, (b) in a way that would maximize the accuracy of their beliefs, or (c) in a way that would maximize the effectiveness of their beliefs for goal achievement. Results suggest that conscious disbelief of one's beliefs is neither impossible nor uncommon, that it is related to desire (though differently for different people), and that it may reflect some degree of accurate awareness of biasing effects of desire. notReviewed other