Dataset_Final_Analysis302

This study investigates the micro-psychological mechanisms behind the “participation paradox” in social accountability, where institutional designs aiming to incentivize oversight often fail. Adopting a Behavioral Public Administration perspective, we propose a framework of “Institution-Value Congruence” to examine how stakeholder interest and monitoring mode interact with citizens’ Social Value Orientation (SVO). Through a third-party punishment dictator game experiment (<i>N</i> = 302), results reveal significant non-linear effects: contrary to the “stakeholder efficacy” assumption, impartial spectators with no stakeholder interest exhibited the strongest punishment severity, confirming the motivation crowding effect of economic incentives. Furthermore, collective monitoring triggered strategic shirking and diffusion of responsibility, but this effect was moderated by individual traits—significantly reducing the punishment willingness of pro-self individuals while leaving pro-social individuals unaffected. These findings suggest that public spirit serves as an internal buffer against institutional failures. We argue that effective anti-corruption governance requires moving beyond simple interest alignment to nurturing the intrinsic role of citizens as “public guardians”, ensuring a congruence between institutional contexts and civic virtues.