Shabiha in Syria, 2021-2022

In order to answer the broader question about the reasons
behind authoritarian regimes’ survival or demise in the face of popular protest primary data collection via interviews has been collected and secondary sources i.e. newspaper articles have been analysed. The aim of the project was achieved by comparing the use of state-sponsored militias, shabiha and titushky, by the regimes of Bashar Al-Assad and Viktor Yanukovych in Syria and Ukraine respectively. It emerges that authoritarian regimes are more likely to survive when they engage in brutal, systematic repression through these actors of repression; when these actors of repression have more complex incentives than simply being thugs for hire, while the national and local elites are more reliable sources of state sponsored militias’ support.<p>For the article on Ukraine and Syria, the new research strand I will develop involves a structured comparison between the regimes of Bashar al-Assad and Viktor Yanukovych. I will demonstrate how incumbent authoritarian regimes can deploy groups of civilians to disperse political protest that threatens to dislodge the regime and disrupt the status quo. A comparison will be drawn between the Syrian Shabiha and Titushki in Ukraine. I will argue that if an authoritarian regime is truly authoritarian, such use of armed civilians should be systematic, violent and clearly linked to the state.
Through this comparison, I will question whether Yanukovych's regime was truly authoritarian as claimed by some analysts. Once it is published in a peer-reviewed journal, the article will generate impact on the academic community who work globally on the resilience of authoritarianism. I will use a novel comparison across space and time. I have already published a short version of this article for an academic blog Strife, which will serve as a framework. I will conduct interviews with activists in Ukraine and Syria (remotely) asking them specifically about the use of Shabiha and Titushki.
The article on the USA-Ukraine comparison will provide a detailed discussion of how elite compromises were worked out in the two countries in the respective antebellum periods and how they helped forestall conflict. I will provide a discussion of the similarities between the two cases and build a theory of "oligarchic peace" that explains the outcome of peace.
The decentralisation reform in Ukraine (2014 - present) is a new phenomenon that was a direct product of the events of 2014 investigated in my thesis. Case studies of countries that have pursued decentralisation to resolve conflicts have yielded mixed results. One school led by Lijphart (1977) and more recently by Miodownik (e.g. with et al., 2004 and with Cartrite, 2010) argues that decentralisation contributes to political stability. Another school led by Roeder argues that decentralisation gives groups resources to engage in secessionism undermining stability.
The two main research questions of this research that will follow after this fellowship are: (1) Does decentralisation contribute to political stability across Ukraine? and (2) Is Ukraine's decentralisation model attractive to the residents of the non-government controlled area of the Donbas and, therefore, is it a viable model for conflict resolution? I will analyse the reform by looking at the Kharkiv and Odesa regions in south-eastern Ukraine. I will build on my doctoral work and test new hypotheses pertaining to how decentralisation affects local protest and the behaviours of local elites. The project will draw on digital and print newspaper reports as well as on interviews and my own public opinion survey. It will contribute to the growing case studies literature on the effects of decentralisation on political stability in fragile contexts.
The puzzle at the heart of my monograph "The Donbas Conflict in Ukraine: Elites, Protest, and Partition", to be published by August 2021, focuses on how the behaviours of local elites and activists definitively contributed to the conflict outcome in Donets'k and the peace outcome in Kharkiv. Drawing on the insights from the literature on informal politics, networks and patronage in the post-Soviet space, I have explained why the elites in Donets'k allowed radical pro-Russian activism in their region while their counterparts in Kharkiv did the opposite.
To support the discussion, I have drawn on the rich evidence from newspaper reports, interviews, social media, videos and blogs in Russian, Ukrainian and English. The book contributes to our understanding of Ukrainian politics, the literature on the Donbas conflict, and the broader literature on elites and conflicts. The book is also important for the broader policy community, especially when it comes to networks and budgetary politics in Ukraine</p>

为解答威权政权在民众抗议面前存续或覆灭的深层动因这一宏观问题，本研究通过访谈开展一手数据采集，并对报纸文章等二手资料展开分析。本项目通过对比叙利亚巴沙尔·阿萨德（Bashar Al-Assad）政权与乌克兰维克托·亚努科维奇（Viktor Yanukovych）政权分别动用国家赞助民兵（state-sponsored militias）、沙比哈（shabiha）与季图什基（titushky）的策略达成了研究目标。研究发现，威权政权若通过这类镇压力量实施残酷且系统化的镇压，则更有可能存续；当这类镇压力量拥有远超"受雇暴徒"的复杂动机，且国家与地方精英为国家赞助民兵提供的支持更为可靠时，威权政权的存续概率更高。

针对乌克兰与叙利亚的研究论文，我将拓展全新的研究脉络，对巴沙尔·阿萨德与维克托·亚努科维奇的政权展开结构化对比。我将阐释现任威权政权如何部署平民团体，驱散有可能颠覆政权、破坏现状的政治抗议活动。本次对比将聚焦叙利亚沙比哈与乌克兰季图什基。我将论证：若某威权政权具备十足的威权属性，则其武装平民的使用应具备系统性、暴力性，且与国家存在明确关联。

通过此番对比，我将质疑部分分析人士所称的"亚努科维奇政权具备十足威权属性"这一论断。待该论文在同行评议期刊（peer-reviewed journal）发表后，将对全球范围内研究威权韧性的学术界产生影响。本研究将采用新颖的跨时空对比方法。我已将本文的精简版发表于学术博客《Strife》，该精简版将作为本研究的框架。我将通过远程方式访谈乌克兰与叙利亚的活动人士，专门询问其关于沙比哈与季图什基的使用情况。

针对美乌对比的研究论文，将详细讨论两国战前时期精英妥协的达成路径，以及这些妥协如何助力规避冲突。我将分析两个案例的相似之处，并构建"寡头和平（oligarchic peace）"理论以解释和平结局的成因。

乌克兰2014年至今的分权（decentralisation）改革是一项全新现象，直接源于我在博士论文中研究的2014年事件。针对为解决冲突而推行分权的多国案例研究，其结论莫衷一是。以利帕特（Lijphart，1977）及其后米奥多尼克（Miodownik等，2004；与卡特里特，2010）为代表的学派认为，分权有助于政治稳定；而以罗德（Roeder）为代表的另一学派则主张，分权会为群体提供资源以从事分离主义活动，进而破坏稳定。

本研究在该奖学金项目结束后的两大核心研究问题为：（1）分权是否有助于乌克兰全境的政治稳定？（2）乌克兰的分权模式是否对顿巴斯（Donbas）非政府控制区的居民具有吸引力，从而能否成为可行的冲突解决方案？我将通过分析乌克兰东南部的哈尔科夫（Kharkiv）与敖德萨（Odesa）地区来评估该项改革。本研究将依托我的博士研究基础，检验关于分权如何影响地方抗议与地方精英行为的全新假设。本项目将整合数字与纸质报纸报道、访谈资料以及我本人开展的民意调查数据。本研究将为不断丰富的分权改革对脆弱语境下政治稳定影响的案例研究文献做出贡献。

我将于2021年8月出版的专著《乌克兰顿巴斯冲突：精英、抗议与分裂》（The Donbas Conflict in Ukraine: Elites, Protest, and Partition）的核心谜题，聚焦地方精英与活动人士的行为如何直接决定了顿涅茨克的冲突结局与哈尔科夫的和平结局。依托后苏联地区非正式政治、网络与庇护政治相关研究的洞见，我已阐释了为何顿涅茨克的精英放任本地区激进亲俄活动，而哈尔科夫的精英却采取了截然相反的做法。

为支撑上述讨论，我利用了俄语、乌克兰语与英语的报纸报道、访谈、社交媒体、视频与博客等丰富证据。本书有助于深化我们对乌克兰政治、顿巴斯冲突相关研究，以及精英与冲突这一更广泛研究领域的理解。本书同时对更广泛的政策界具有重要价值，尤其是在乌克兰的网络与预算政治领域。