Social Insurance and Migration: Evidence from a Nation-Wide Institutional Reform in China

In this paper we examine the causal relationship between formal social insurance and individuals migration decisions. We exploit a quasi experimental design in rural China, under which county officials were assigned to a group of villages (i.e., treated villages) to serve as village supervisors (VSs本研究旨在考察正式社会保险（formal social insurance）与个体迁移决策之间的因果关系。我们利用中国农村地区的准实验设计（quasi experimental design）开展研究，在此设计框架下，县级官员被指派至一批村庄（即处理组村庄）担任村庄监督员（village supervisors，VSs）

搜集汇总

背景与挑战

背景概述

该数据集基于中国一项全国性制度改革，研究正式社会保险对个人迁移决策的因果影响。采用准实验设计，在乡村地区实施，通过指派县官员担任村监督员来收集证据，聚焦于农村社会政策与人口流动的关系。