Military in the Cabinet and Defense Spending of Civilian Governments

In this article, we assess the variation in civilian governments' defense spending as a function of civil-military relations. We present a novel explanation based on the military's presence in the political decision- making apparatus. We argue that the appointment of an active military officer in a key governmental position allows the government to make a more credible commitment to provide the military with adequate rents and thereby stabilizes civil-military relations. The appointment helps defuse the commitment problem on the part of the government by reducing the coordination costs for the military to challenge the government more successfully in the event of the government's defection. Hence, the military's incentive to intervene in politics to prevent government monopolies over rents lessens markedly. Defense spending increases as a result because this arrangement requires the government to honor its promises to distribute increased rents among the military members of the winning coalition. Our theory predicts higher defense spending in cases where the military has a presence in the top- level policy-making positions within a civilian government. We find strong empirical evidence in support of our argument using data from 1984 to 2011. Civilian governments with a military presence in the cabinet's security-related portfolios experience up to a 20 percent increase in their defense spending on average. This study offers important insights into governments’ motivation to appoint active-duty military officers in key policy-making positions and the effects of such appointments on civil-military resource allocation.