Floating Offshore Wind Array FMEA (Failure Mode and Effects Analysis) Database

Floating Wind Array FMEA (Failure Mode and Effects Analysis) Database Purpose of the FMEA Database This database consolidates all WP3 failure‑risk evaluation and mitigation‑assessment results into a single structured format. It supports: •Comparison of failure risks and mitigation options •Development of the open‑access WP3 FMEA database •Future updates within IEA Wind Task 49 •Research, design‑basis development, and reliability assessment for floating offshore wind arrays The database compiles the failure‑mode scoring and mitigation‑option scoring developed in WP3 of IEA Wind Task 49: Integrated Design of Floating Wind Arrays. It integrates results from two WP3 reports: Failure Risk Evaluation of Floating Offshore Wind Turbines with Farm‑Level Implications and Failure Risk Mitigation for Floating Offshore Wind Arrays The database provides a unified structure for WP3 FMEA results across five subsystems: •Tower •Transition Piece •Floating Support Structure •Station Keeping System •Dynamic Cable It includes component‑level risk scoring (Occurrence, Severity, Detectability) and mitigation‑option scoring (Effectiveness, TRL, Cost Impact, Array Scalability) for failure modes with potential farm‑level implications. Participants and Data Collection WP3 data were collected through: literature review, structured FMEA survey, two expert workshops and expert‑elicitation mitigation survey. The failure‑risk evaluation involved up to seven participants from research institutions, universities, consultancies, and industry. The mitigation assessment involved four specialised experts, each scoring predefined and expert‑added mitigation options and providing qualitative comments. This mixed‑method approach ensures that the database reflects both structured scoring and expert judgement across multiple subsystems. Failure Risk Evaluation [Ref 1]: WP3 identified 120 component‑level failure modes across the five subsystems. Each failure mode was evaluated using three qualitative criteria: •Occurrence (O): Likelihood or frequency of the failure mode •Severity (S): Impact on personnel safety, environment, asset integrity, and operation •Detectability (D): Ability to detect the failure before a critical event The Risk Priority Number (RPN) is calculated as: "RPN"=O⋅S⋅D A higher RPN indicates a more critical failure mode with higher priority for mitigation or monitoring. During WP3 workshops, participants indicated whether each failure mode could cause array‑ or farm‑level effects (e.g., cascading failures, shared‑infrastructure impacts, multi‑turbine consequences). Only failure modes where the majority answered “Yes” were selected for mitigation assessment. This resulted in 46 farm‑level failure modes, forming the basis of Ref 2. Failure Mitigation Assessment [Ref 2]: Mitigation options were evaluated only for the 46 farm‑level failure modes identified in [Ref 1]. A harmonised expert‑elicitation framework was used to score predefined and expert‑added mitigation options using four criteria: •Effectiveness: Ability to reduce failure likelihood or consequences •Technology Readiness Level (TRL): Maturity of the mitigation technology or practice •Cost Impact: Relative cost implications •Array Scalability: Suitability for multi‑turbine or array‑level deployment Weighted scoring logic for both risk evaluation and mitigation is provided in the CriteriaScoring sheet. Interpreting Mitigation Scores: Mitigation scores use a deliberately narrow scoring range, meaning differences between options are moderate. Scores should be interpreted comparatively, not as absolute performance indicators. Experts also provided qualitative comments referencing standards, modelling considerations, monitoring practices, QA/QC issues, and subsystem‑specific constraints. These comments are included in each subsystem sheet. Important Note on Use This database contains raw expert‑input data from WP3. It must be used together with: [Ref 1] and [Ref 2], where: interpretation of results, methodological limitations, assumptions, scoring considerations and subsystem‑specific context are fully explained. The associated journal publication [Ref 3] provides additional discussion and synthesis of WP3 findings. References Ref 1: Yildirim, B., Kamidelivand, M., Nasr, C., Persent, E., Slack, E., Schlanbusch, R., Jiang, Z., Kolios, A. (2025). Failure Risk Evaluation of Floating Offshore Wind Turbines with Farm‑Level Implications. IEA Wind Task 49. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.20211173 Ref 2: Kamidelivand, M., & Yildirim, B. (2026). IEA Wind TCP Task 49 – Failure Risk Mitigation for Floating Offshore Wind Arrays. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.21211759 Ref 3: Yildirim B., Kamidelivand M., Dimitrov N., Kolios A. (2026). Failure mode risk prioritization for floating wind turbines: An expert-based FMEA framework from IEA wind task 49. Energy Reports, 15, 109072. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.egyr.2026.109072 How to Cite This Database This FMEA database includes raw expert‑elicited scoring and comments. Recommended citation: Kamidelivand, M., & Yildirim, B. (2026). Floating Wind Array FMEA (Failure Mode, Effects and Analysis) Database. IEA Wind TCP Task 49. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.21347445 Acknowledgement The authors acknowledge the contributions of all participants in IEA Wind Task 49 – Work Package 3, as well as additional feedback from Task 49 contributors and external experts who supported the development of this database. Mitra Kamidelivand’s contribution was supported by the Sustainable Energy Authority of Ireland (SEAI) through the SEAI Research, Development & Demonstration Funding Programme 2022, grant number 22/RDD/804.