Replication Data for: Taxing the Tails in a Global Economy: How Electoral, Party and Wage Bargaining Systems Interact to Determine the Taxes Paid by the Poor and Rich

A prominent line of research on electoral systems and income redistribution argues that PR leads to tax and transfer policies that benefit the poor at the expense of the rich. This is because PR produces encompassing center-left coalitions that protect the poor and middle classes. Two facts that are inconsistent with this expectation are that countries with PR electoral systems tend to rely heavily on consumption taxes and tax profits lightly. Both policies are regressive and seem to benefit the rich at the expense of the poor. I argue that PR electoral institutions, when combined with trichotomous multipartism, are not as hostile to the rich as commonly believed and that we need to understand how electoral and party systems interact with labor market institutions to explain the puzzling pattern of taxation that we observe. I develop a theoretical model and evaluate its empirical implications for a world in which production has become multinational.