Replication Data for "Embeddedness of Disciplinary Bureaucrats and Anti-corruption Investigation---Evidence from China"

The establishment of an independent or centralized anti-corruption institution has long been considered an effective strategy for curbing corruption in developing countries. This paper investigates the mechanism underlying such an institutional arrangement from the perspective of the local embeddedness of disciplinary bureaucrats with evidence from China. In order to fight widespread corruption in China, the Chinese Communist Party has centralized the procedures of nominating local disciplinary officials. This paper examines the effectiveness of this institutional reform by analyzing an original data set on disciplinary leaders and anti-corruption investigation in 31 Chinese provinces. One finding is that the presence of native officials has been declining in the disciplinary inspection system since the late 1980s and that the Chinese Communist Party has been able to constrain local political networks by assigning non-native officials to critical local party positions. Another finding is that native disciplinary leaders and those with stronger local connection tend to investigate less corrupt party cadres in their provinces. The evidence suggests that weakened local embeddedness of disciplinary bureaucrats is conducive to improving their performance.