Replication Data: "Distributive Outcomes in Contested Maritime Areas: The Role of Inside Options in Settling Competing Claims"

Outside options can induce bargaining asymmetries that influence the outcome of international negotiations. But what happens to bargaining outcomes when an international regime provides states with an institutionalized alternative to a negotiated agreement that levels the playing field between states? In the case of maritime boundaries, the Law of the Sea (LOS) establishes the geographic median line as the maximum any state can claim in the absence of an agreement. This ‘inside option’ serves as de facto status quo, which is supported by international norms, but lacks the legal certainty of a formal agreement. We find that when states have the choice between using the status quo or creating legal certainty around their maritime boundaries, the discovery of offshore oil or gas increases the likelihood of settlement and results in more even distributive outcomes. Drawing on Martin Pratt’s list of maritime boundaries worldwide and extending the Global Maritime Boundaries Database, we identify the geolocation of EEZs, the delineation line for settled boundaries, and the median line. On this basis we analyze the decision to settle and distributional outcomes.for the years 1960 to 2008.