Replication Data for: Purifying the Leviathan: The Strategic Dilemma of an Anti-corruption Campaign Under One-Party Rule

Despite the popular perception of corruption as ``business as usual,'' leaders in authoritarian regimes often wage massive anti-corruption campaigns. This paper analyzes leaders' strategic dilemma between boosting the economy and maintaining political loyalty in the context of the recent anti-corruption campaign in China. Condoning corruption helps economic rent production, which is necessary for building the ruling coalition; however, corruption gives rise to social grievances and erodes supports for the ruling party. Depending on the severity of institutional loophole and the perceived damage of corruption to popular support, leaders may switch between a permissive model and a punitive model of governance. The theoretical predictions are consistent with the changing patterns of bureaucratic selection, anti-corruption investigations, as well as machine learning-based analysis of the annual work reports of city governments in China.