Replication Data for: "Expectations, Gender Bias, and Federal Reserve Talk: Do Americans Trust Women as Central Bankers?"

Political economy models of monetary policy typically ignore gender as a determinant of public expectations about the economy. This is understandable, given the historical rarity of female central bankers globally and the unclear designation of the economic domain as gendered. To be effective, central bankers must project expertise and a commitment to fighting inflation. Those attributes, however, are often man-coded, which may undermine women central bankers. We use a novel experiment to assess gender bias when the US Federal Reserve engages the broad public. The findings suggest significant bias, particularly among men. Messaging associated with women central bankers was less able to influence men’s optimism about the economic future or their trust in the Federal Reserve. Male respondents also displayed a disproportionate inability to recognize female central bankers’ gender. Contrary to expectation, signaling female central bankers’ competence did not affect men’s bias, though it increased their appeal to other women.