Dataset: Sanctions and international interaction improve cooperation to avert climate change

Imposing sanctions on non-compliant parties to international agreements is advocated as a remedy for international cooperation failure. Nevertheless, sanctions are costly, and rational choice theory predicts their ineffectiveness in improving cooperation. We test sanctions effectiveness experimentally in international collective-risk social dilemmas simulating efforts to avoid catastrophic climate change. We involve individuals from countries where sanctions were shown to be effective (Germany) or ineffective (Russia) in increasing cooperation. Here we show that, while this result still holds nationally, international interaction backed by sanctions is beneficial. Cooperation by low cooperator groups increases relative to national cooperation and converges to the levels of high cooperators. This result holds regardless of revealing other group members' nationality, suggesting that participants' specific attitudes or stereotypes over the other country were irrelevant. Groups interacting under sanctions contribute more to catastrophe prevention than what would maximise expected group payoffs. This behaviour signals a strong propensity for protection against collective risks.

Methods
The dataset was collected in lab experiments conducted with the Ztree software (Fischbacher, U. 2007 z-Tree: Zurich toolbox for ready-made economic experiments. Exp. Econ. 10, 171-178.) Raw data have been assembled in csv format and analysed with Stata17.