Replication Data for: Outsourcing machines. How programmatic parties include clientelistic strategies

What explains that programmatic parties may combine their policy offers with clientelistic dispensation? Prevailing knowledge suggests that parties top-down diversify linkages, targeting their program at wealthier voters while providing particularistic inducements to poorer ones. Yet, these frameworks fail to explain the variety of strategies used by politicians to link voters within the municipal context, where voters’ socioeconomic status and electoral competition are less likely to vary. I argue that programmatic parties may engage in clientelism at the municipal level when they receive bottom-up demands. Leveraging evidence from 97 in-depth interviews conducted during multiyear fieldwork in three Chilean municipalities, this article shows why and how programmatic parties outsource the cost of clientelism to neighbourhood associations in exchange for targeted distribution to solve the groups’ demands. By showing that clientelism in programmatic-oriented settings is demand-driven, the article draws attention to territorially-rooted local groups as key actors that help to explain the variety of strategies parties use to link with voters.