Data and Code for: The Organization of Innovation: Incomplete Contracts and the Outsourcing Decision
收藏DataCite Commons2026-03-24 更新2026-05-03 收录
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https://www.openicpsr.org/openicpsr/project/224602/view
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资源简介：
Why do firms outsource research and development (R&D) for some products while conducting R&D in-house for similar ones? An innovating firm risks cannibalizing its existing products. The more profitable these products, the more the firm wants to limit cannibalization. We apply this logic to the organization of R&D by introducing a novel theoretical model in which developing in-house provides the firm more control over the new product's location in product space. An empirical analysis of our testable predictions using pharmaceutical data concerning patents, patent expiration, and outsourcing at various stages of the R&D process supports our theoretical approach.
提供机构：
ICPSR - Interuniversity Consortium for Political and Social Research
创建时间：
2026-03-24
