Data and Code for: License Complementarity and Package Bidding: U.S. Spectrum Auctions

U.S. spectrum licenses cover geographically distinct areas and often complement each other. A bidder seeking to acquire multiple licenses is then exposed to risks of winning only isolated patches. We evaluate the extent to which allowing bidders to bid for (predetermined) packages of licenses alleviates the exposure problem and improves allocation eciency. Using Auction 73 bidding data, we model the bidding process as an entry game with interdependent markets and evolving bidder belief. Bidders' decisions on bidding (and not bidding) provide bounds on licenses' stand-alone values and complementarity between licenses. With estimated bidder valuation, we conduct counterfactual analyses to show that the eects of package bidding on bidders' exposure risks depend on package format and package size. More importantly, package bidding increases auction revenue substantially, at the cost of reducing bidder surplus and increasing license allocation concentration.