ECIN Replication Package for "Tacit Collusion by Pricing Algorithms"

This repository contains replication package for Economics Inquiry article "Tacit Collusion by Pricing Algorithms". This article contributes to the debate about the potential of pricing algorithms to colludeand earn supra-competitive profits without explicit communication. By simulating<br>competition among seven algorithms, we demonstrate that: (1) algorithms can reach<br>supra-competitive prices in a reasonably short time, taking less than 1/1,000th the time<br>taken by algorithms in recent studies; and (2) tacit collusion among the algorithms is<br>robust to the choice of different algorithms by competing firms. These results address<br>the main criticisms concerning the practical relevance of recent studies that demonstrate<br>algorithmic collusion. We find that the top-performing algorithms are nice, forgiving,<br>provocable, and flexible.<br>