Data for: Bonuses and managerial misbehaviour

Abstract of associated article: Profit-based bonus payments have been criticised for encouraging managers to take excessively risky actions or to engage in other activities that are not in the firm׳s best interest. We show, however, that large bonuses may discourage managers from such misbehaviour, because they have more to lose in the event that misbehaviour is detected. Thus, large bonuses may be an optimal way for firms to control misbehaviour. Our finding sheds new light on recent proposals to regulate bonuses.

相关文章摘要：基于利润的奖金支付制度常受到批评，认为其可能激励管理者采取过度的风险行为，或参与其他并非公司最佳利益的活动。然而，本研究表明，高额奖金可能反而会遏制管理者的不当行为，因为他们若被察觉到不当行为，所面临的损失更大。因此，高额奖金可能是公司控制不当行为的最佳途径。我们的发现为近期关于奖金监管的提议提供了新的视角。