Data for: Civil war and U.S. foreign influence

Abstract of associated article: We study how foreign interventions affect civil war around the world. In an infinitely repeated game we combine a gambling for resurrection mechanism for the influencing country with the canonical bargaining model of war in the influenced country to micro-found sudden shifts in power among the domestic bargaining partners, which are known to lead to war due to commitment problems. We test two of our model predictions that allow us to identify the influence of foreign intervention on civil war incidence: (i) civil wars around the world are more likely under Republican governments and (ii) the probability of civil wars decreases with the U.S. presidential approval rates. These results withstand several robustness checks and, overall, suggest that foreign influence is a sizable driver of domestic conflict.

相关文章摘要：本研究探讨外国干预如何影响全球范围内的内战。在无限重复博弈中，我们结合了影响国的赌博式复兴机制与受影响国战争的经典谈判模型，以微观视角解析国内谈判伙伴之间权力突然转变的现象，这种现象因承诺问题而众所周知，可能导致战争。我们测试了模型中的两个预测，这两个预测使我们能够识别外国干预对内战发生的影响：（一）在全球范围内，共和党政府下的内战更为普遍；（二）随着美国总统的批准率提高，内战的可能性降低。这些结果经过多次稳健性检验，总体上表明外国干预是国内冲突的重要驱动因素。