Data and software for "The effects of reputation on inequality in network cooperation games"

Processed experimental data, NetLogo script for agent-based model, and Python scripts for model and data analyses for the paper "The effects of reputation on inequality in network cooperation games" in Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B. The experimental data comes from the following studies:
K. Kamei, L. Putterman, Play it again: Partner choice, reputation building and learning from finitely repeated dilemma games. Econ. J. 127, 1069–1095 (2017).
G. E. Bolton, E. Katok, A. Ockenfels, How effective are electronic reputation mechanisms? An experimental investigation. Manag. Sci. 50, 1587–1602 (2004).
G. E. Bolton, E. Katok, A. Ockenfels, Cooperation among strangers with limited information about reputation. J. Public Econ. 89, 1457–1468 (2005).
I. Seinen, A. Schram, Social status and group norms: Indirect reciprocity in a repeated helping experiment. Eur. Econ. Rev. 50, 581–602 (2006).
J. A. Cuesta, C. Gracia-Lázaro, A. Ferrer, Y. Moreno, A. Sánchez, Reputation drives cooperative behaviour and network formation in human groups. Sci. Rep. 5, 7843 (2015).
D. Melamed, A. Harrell, B. Simpson, Cooperation, clustering, and assortative mixing in dynamic networks. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci., 201715357 (2018).
D. O. Stahl, An experimental test of the efficacy of a simple reputation mechanism to solve social dilemmas. J. Econ. Behav. Organ. 94, 116–124 (2013).
R.C. Bayer, Cooperation in partnerships: The role of breakups and reputation. J. Institutional Theor. Econ. JITE 172, 615–638 (2016).
A. Harrell, D. Melamed, B. Simpson, The strength of dynamic ties: The ability to alter some ties promotes cooperation in those that cannot be altered. Sci. Adv. 4, eaau9109 (2018).