Replication Data for: US Disaster Aid and Bilateral Trade Growth

Previous research demonstrates that the decision to issue international disaster aid depends in part on the political relationship between donor and recipient countries. However, the reverse case – the impact of disaster aid on subsequent relationships – remains untested. In this paper, I demonstrate that, for states having recently suffered a natural disaster, a higher commitment of US disaster aid results in a subsequent increase in US-disaster victim trade. I use error correction models (ECMs) to assess the short- and long-term influence of US disaster aid on trade growth over the 1973-2008 period. My results suggest that an increase in disaster aid often leads to a subsequent increase in bilateral trade considerably larger than the initial aid commitment. I also find, controlling for other determinants of disaster aid, that preexisting trade with the US is not associated with a victim’s likelihood of receiving US aid. These findings are important for policy-makers, suggesting the presence of a material incentive to complement humanitarian imperatives to grant disaster assistance.