Replication Data for: Incumbent Tenure Crowds Out Economic Voting

Does the importance of the economy change during a government's time in office? Governments arguably become more responsible for current economic conditions during their tenure. This might lead voters to hold experienced governments more accountable for economic conditions. However, voters also accumulate information about governments' competence over time. If voters are Bayesian learners, then this growing stock of information should crowd out the importance of current economic conditions. We explore these divergent predictions about the relationship between tenure and the economic vote using three datasets. First, using country-level data from a diverse set of elections, we find that support for experienced governments is less dependent on economic growth. Second, using individual-level data from 60 election surveys covering 10 countries, we find that voters' perceptions of the economy matters more for government support when the government is inexperienced. Finally, we use a municipal reform in Denmark that assigned some voters to new local incumbents. We find that voters assigned to new incumbents respond more strongly to the local economy. In conclusion, all three studies point in the same direction---economic voting decreases with time in office.