Replication Data for: Cutting in Line: How Powerful Organized Interests Hasten & Delay Executive Branch Nominations

Despite the potential to shape policy in every domain of government, organized interests have not been central to discussions of the nomination process for bureaucratic appointments. We test measures of the quantity of interest group opposition and support for nominees as well as the power of groups on nomination outcomes and duration. Using an original dataset of interest involvement in nominations stretching from the 106th to 115th Congresses, we find that powerful interests affect the timing of executive branch nominations for confirmation and return. Interests weigh-in on nominations when the stakes are high, and legislators heed the call of the most powerful groups over the sheer number of groups. The influence of interests in the committee stage is similar but more limited. Our analysis shows that organized interests affect the bureaucracy well before nominees make it to office by speeding up or slowing down their time to confirmation, return or withdrawal.