Replication Data for: Lobbying on Multiple Routes to Influence National Legislation: German Federalism and the European Union

The article analyses how interest groups lobby at different levels of government to influence national legislation. Adapting Greenwood’s (2017) argument about routes for influence-seeking in the EU to the case of national policy-making in a multi-level system, we argue that interest groups can pursue three distinct multi-level routes to circumvent the national executive and parliament: a Brussels route, a domestic subnational route, and a subnational-Brussels route to national policymaking. Investigating the case of Germany, our analysis of survey data on interest group behavior shows that, firstly, multi-level-lobbying is a complement rather than a substitute to national-level lobbying. Secondly, interest groups try to affect federal legislation much more often via the subnational than via the supranational level, especially when they share a common goal with their subnational government. A third finding is that interest groups also address venues without formal legislative power. Overall, our study shows the strategic importance of multi-level lobbying in national policymaking.