Data for: Oil, governance and the (mis)allocation of talent in developing countries

Abstract of associated article: This paper sheds light on the relationship between oil rent and the allocation of talent, toward rent-seeking versus more productive activities, conditional on the quality of institutions. Using a sample of 69 developing countries, we demonstrate that oil resources orient university students toward specializations that provide better future access to rents when institutions are weak. The results are robust to various specifications, datasets on governance quality and estimation methods. Oil affects the demand for each profession through a technological effect, indicating complementarity between oil and engineering, manufacturing and construction; however, it also increases the ‘size of the cake’. Therefore, when institutions are weak, oil increases the incentive to opt for professions with better access to rents (law, business, and the social sciences), rather than careers in engineering, creating a deviation from the optimal allocation between the two types of specialization.关联论文摘要：本研究聚焦于制度质量约束下，石油租金与人才配置（寻租活动与更高生产效率活动）之间的关联。我们以69个发展中国家为样本开展实证分析，结果表明，在制度质量薄弱的情境中，石油资源会引导高校学生转向未来更易获取租金的专业方向。该研究结果在多种模型设定、治理质量数据集以及估计方法下均保持稳健。石油通过技术效应影响各职业的需求格局，体现为石油产业与工程、制造及建筑业之间存在互补关系；与此同时，石油也会扩大整体收益蛋糕的规模。因此，在制度质量薄弱时，石油会强化个体选择高租金获取渠道职业（法学、商学与社会科学）的动机，而非投身工程领域的职业，由此造成两类专业方向的配置偏离最优状态。