Data for: Pay, peek, punish? Repayment, information acquisition and punishment in a microcredit lab-in-the-field experiment

Abstract of associated article: Despite remarkable repayment rates in microcredit group lending, anecdotal evidence from the field suggests that there is excessive punishment among group members. To quantify excessive peer punishment, I conduct a lab-in-the-field experiment with actual microcredit borrowers in rural India. I design a repayment coordination game with strategic default and the possibility of acquiring information about a peer's investment return (peer peeking) and of sanctioning a peer (peer punishment). I observe loan repayment of over 90% and punishment of around 85%. Punishment is classified as excessive compared to a game-theoretically derived benchmark of zero punishment and a behaviorally-rooted benchmark of unjust punishment. This gives solid support to the anecdotal evidence and manifests the concern of excessive peer pressure in microcredit group lending. The most promising explanation is that borrowers have internalized the mission indoctrination of the microlender of what constitutes a good borrower, namely repaying loans and disciplining peers.关联论文摘要：尽管小额信贷团体贷款的还款率表现亮眼，但实地轶事证据显示，团体成员间存在过度惩罚现象。为量化同伴过度惩罚行为，我与印度农村地区的实际小额信贷借款人开展田野实验室实验。我设计了一款包含策略性违约、可获取同伴投资回报信息（即同伴窥探（peer peeking））以及可对同伴实施制裁（即同伴惩罚（peer punishment））的还款协调博弈。实验结果显示，贷款还款率超过90%，惩罚发生率约为85%。相较于博弈论推导的零惩罚基准，以及基于行为逻辑的不公平惩罚基准，本次实验中的惩罚行为被判定为过度。这为实地轶事证据提供了坚实支撑，也印证了小额信贷团体贷款中同伴压力过度的担忧。最具说服力的解释是，借款人已将小额信贷机构灌输的、关于“合格借款人”的定义（即按时还款并惩戒同伴）内化为自身行为准则。