Legibility Layers of υ-Kama: A Layered Framework for External Comprehension Without Internal Compromise

u-Kama is an ecological–monetary coordination system in which ecological truth is recognised through time-bound, place-bound verification rather than inferred through prices, institutional authority, or consensus mechanisms. This introduces a fundamental design tension: the system must be legible to external participants, institutions, and capital, while simultaneously preventing those actors from influencing ecological verification, qualification, or state transitions. This paper introduces the Legibility Layers Framework, a formal architecture that partitions u-Kama into six distinct domains of external intelligibility. Each layer defines what may be understood and engaged with by a specific audience — scholars, investors, regulators, practitioners, local communities, and the public — while preserving strict non-interference with the ecological core. The framework is governed by a structural membrane condition under which observation, interpretation, and funding are permitted, but authority over ecological outcomes is not. Drawing on Hayek's knowledge problem, Goodhart's law, Campbell's law, and Ostrom's governance of commons, the paper demonstrates how legibility can be structured without collapsing into manipulability. A Legibility–Authority Separation Theorem is stated formally: for all external actors, legibility does not imply authority, and external action has zero effect on ecological truth unless the actor is a qualified in-situ witness under defined verification conditions. The framework is illustrated through a worked case example of a single ecological cell across one seasonal cycle, and is integrated with the Tritestium Verification Doctrine, which governs how ecological truth is recognised within the system. Together, these components establish a formal separation between epistemic authority and economic participation — a design property the authors argue is necessary for any coordination system intended to resist Goodhart effects, governance capture, and external optimisation pressure.