Improving the efficiency of pretrial bargaining in disputes over noncompliance with international law: encouraging evidence from the European Union

International institutions can create pretrial bargaining procedures to resolve disputes over noncompliance with international law. In this article, we consider how international institutions can improve the efficiency of pretrial bargaining, thereby reducing the compliance deficit. We use a quasi-experimental research design and difference-in-differences (DD) estimators to analyze the effectiveness of a recent policy initiative in the European Union (EU) – called EU Pilot – that was designed to improve the efficiency of pretrial bargaining in the EU. By evaluating the effectiveness of EU Pilot, we provide new evidence of a proposed management school solution to noncompliance – proper rule interpretation. By preventing accidental noncompliance, EU Pilot allows the Commission and member states to more quickly process cases involving intentional noncompliance, improving the efficiency of pretrial bargaining in the EU.