Data for: A heterogeneous agent model of credit-linked index insurance and farm technology adoption

Abstract of associated article: Protection from downside risk is a determinant of technology uptake among subsistence agricultural households. Access to credit, insurance and savings may stimulate technology adoption where new methods are riskier but higher-yielding or require sunk costs. In this paper, we employ a dynamic, stochastic, heterogeneous agent model where farm households have access to contingent credit and make savings, technology and loan repayment choices. Our approach is novel as insurance is modeled as a meso-level product, where the bank is indemnified before any payouts are distributed to borrowers; thus, it accounts for both supply- and demand-side concerns, showing a flow of effects when index insurance contracts are sold to risk aggregators for whom basis risk is lower. Results show letting the lender lay first claim on indemnities lowers default, which can decrease interest rates and expand credit access. Insurance and savings may also spur technology uptake.相关论文摘要：规避下行风险是自给自足农业家庭采纳农业技术的核心决定因素。当新技术兼具更高风险与更优收益，或需要投入沉没成本时，获取信贷、保险与储蓄服务可有效推动农户采纳此类技术。本文采用动态随机异质性智能体（heterogeneous agent）模型，设定农户可获得或有信贷（contingent credit），并可自主开展储蓄、技术选择与贷款偿还决策。本研究的创新之处在于将保险建模为中观层级的金融产品：银行可在向借款人支付赔款前先行获得自身的赔偿保障，该框架同时兼顾供给端与需求端的双重考量，并可清晰展现当指数保险（index insurance）合约被出售给基差风险（basis risk）更低的风险聚合机构（risk aggregators）时的作用传导路径。研究结果表明，赋予放款机构对赔款的优先求偿权可降低违约率，进而压低贷款利率并扩大信贷可得性。保险与储蓄服务同样能够刺激农业技术的采纳。