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Data for: The labor market effects of introducing unemployment benefits in an economy with high informality

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Mendeley Data2016-12-09 更新2026-04-09 收录
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Abstract of associated article: Unemployment benefit systems are nonexistent in many developing economies. Introducing such systems poses many challenges which are partly due to the high level of informality in the labor markets of these economies. This paper studies the consequences on the labor market of implementing an unemployment benefit system in economies with large informal sectors and high flows of workers between formality and informality. We build a search and matching model with endogenous destruction, on-the-job search, and intersectoral flows, where agents in the economy decide optimally whether or not to formalize jobs. We calibrate the model for Mexico, and show that the introduction of an unemployment benefit system, where workers contribute when employed in the formal market and collect benefits when they lose their jobs, even if they obtain informal jobs, can lead to an increase in formality in the economy, while also producing small increases in unemployment. The exact impact of incorporating such benefits depends on the relative strength of two opposing effects: the generosity of the benefits and the level of the contributions that finance those benefits. We also show important policy complementarities with other interventions in the labor market. In particular, combining the unemployment benefit program with policies that reduce the cost of formality, such as lower employment taxes and firing costs, can produce greater decreases in informality and lower impacts on unemployment than when the program is applied in isolation.

相关研究论文摘要:许多发展中经济体尚未建立失业保险制度。引入此类制度面临诸多挑战,这在一定程度上源于这些经济体劳动力市场的非正规化水平较高。本文针对存在大规模非正规部门、劳动力在正规与非正规就业间高频流动的经济体,探讨引入失业保险制度对其劳动力市场的影响。我们构建了包含内生性岗位破坏、在职求职与部门间流动的搜寻匹配模型,经济主体可自主决策是否将就业正规化。我们以墨西哥为对象对模型进行校准,结果显示,引入如下失业保险制度可推动经济体就业正规化水平提升,同时仅会小幅推高失业率:劳动者在正规部门就业时缴纳保费,失业后即可领取待遇,即便其后续找到的是非正规就业岗位。引入该制度的确切效果,取决于两种反向效应的相对强弱:一是待遇的优厚程度,二是用于筹资的缴费水平。我们还发现,该制度与劳动力市场其他干预政策存在重要的政策互补效应。具体而言,将失业保险计划与降低正规化成本的政策(如下调就业税费与解雇成本)相结合,相比单独实施该计划,能够更大幅度地降低非正规就业比例,同时减轻对失业率的负面影响。

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2016-12-09
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