Replication Data for: Strategies of Repression: Judicial and Extrajudicial Methods of Autocratic Survival

Strategies of repression vary widely between extrajudicial and judicial extremes, from unrestrained acts of violence to highly routinized legal procedures. While the former have received a great deal of scholarly attention, judicial methods remain relatively understudied. When and why do rulers repress their rivals in court? I argue that autocrats use a judicial strategy of repression when confronting challengers from within the ruling elite. Unlike regime outsiders – who pose a common, external threat to mobilize against – insiders present a more divisive target. When autocrats confront the latter, a judicial strategy legitimizes punishment, deters future rivals, and generates shared beliefs regarding incumbent strength and challenger weakness. Using original data on political prisoners in postcolonial sub-Saharan Africa, I find that autocrats were significantly more likely to use a judicial strategy against insiders and an extrajudicial strategy against outsiders. A case study of Kenya traces the logic of the theory, showing how intra-regime conflict made courts a valuable instrument of state repression. Overall, the findings demonstrate how courts can play a central role in autocratic survival.