Replication Data for: International Monetary Fund programs and the glass cliff effect

We analyze the impact of International Monetary Fund (IMF) programs on appointing women leaders in ministerial positions. We hypothesize that women leaders are selected after an incumbent government starts an IMF program to shift accountability to them during political and economic turmoil. This political maneuvering of appointing women to leadership positions during a crisis is known as the ‘glass cliff’ effect. We demonstrate substantial evidence for such a ‘glass cliff’ effect using data covering all IMF programs from 1980 to 2018. Our evidence shows that women are more likely to be appointed to austerity-bearing ministerial positions under IMF programs but not in positions of authority during negotiations with the IMF. This effect is more pronounced when a country displays worse societal gender norms, a higher level of corruption, and a government facing a deeper economic crisis. Importantly, we verify that neither women leadership nor a higher share of women in government predicts a balance of payments crisis triggering an IMF program. In other words, women leaders do not govern worse; they are appointed to leadership positions in precarious, crisis-ridden conditions.