Experimental Examination of Audit Reporting Standards Data

We conducted an experimental investigation on the impact of a Disclosure requirement (publicly disclosing the auditors actual name) and Sign-Off requirement (requiring auditors to sign-off on the audit report) on auditor misreporting decisions. We used an experimental audit market based on the economic model in Magee and Tseng (1990). Markets were conducted via networked computers utilizing z-tree software (Fischbacher, 2007) and student participants. Two experimental sessions were conducted for each of the four experimental conditions and each session was conducted with two markets operating simultaneously. Consistent with prior research, participants were randomly reassigned to a different market group at the end of each market year (two trading periods) in order to help control reputational concerns among participants, and to remove market group confounds (Calegari, Schatzberg and Sevcik (1998); Schatzberg, Sevcik, Shapiro, Thorne and Wallace (2005); Blay, Gooden, Mellon and Stevens (2019a); Blay, Gooden, Mellon and Stevens (2019b). All manipulations were administered on a between-subjects basis and all participants maintained their original randomly assigned role throughout the experiment. For a detailed description and discussion of the audit market setting, including equilibrium predictions see Blay et al. (2019b). We used the same experimental parameters as the audit markets described in Blay et al. (2019b), with three notable differences. First, we increased the penalty for misreporting from $0.05 to $0.25 in order for the economic penalty for misreporting to be consistent with Blay, Gooden, Mellon and Stevens (2019a). This enables us to better directly compare our results to prior research (Blay et al (2019a) and Schatzberg, Sevcik, Shapiro, Thorne and Wallace (2005)), while also allowing us to understand the interplay between economic penalties and the underlying theoretical mechanisms behind the observed reporting behavior. Second, we eliminated the pre-experimental quiz included in the instructions used in Blay et al. (2019b). Instead, we report the results of the Ethics Position Questionnaire (EPQ), Forsyth (1980), which can be used to measure individual differences in moral thought using its idealism and relativism scales. Lastly, Blay et al. (2019b) presented a 3x1 between-participants experimental design in which disclosure is manipulated at three levels. In particular, Blay et al. (2019b) examined the impact no disclosure, disclosure only, and disclosure with sign-off on auditor misreporting. Instead, we utilized a 2 x 2 between-participants experimental design in which we examined following experimental conditions: No Sign-Off or Disclosure, Sign-Off Only, Disclosure Only, and Sign-Off with Disclosure. We believe that this design choice allows for a more direct comparison between the results of the two studies. In addition to the raw data from the study, the reported Excel file includes a tab with data descriptions.本研究针对披露要求（公开披露审计师真实姓名）与签署要求（要求审计师在审计报告上签署）对审计师错报决策的影响开展实验研究。实验审计市场基于Magee与Tseng（1990）提出的经济模型，通过联网计算机结合z-tree软件（Fischbacher, 2007）开展，参与者为在校学生。四个实验条件各开展两次实验场次，每场同时运行两个市场。 与既往研究一致，本实验在每个市场年度（含两个交易时段）结束时，将参与者随机重新分配至不同的市场组别，以控制参与者间的声誉顾虑，并消除市场组别混淆变量（Calegari、Schatzberg与Sevcik, 1998；Schatzberg、Sevcik、Shapiro、Thorne与Wallace, 2005；Blay、Gooden、Mellon与Stevens, 2019a；Blay、Gooden、Mellon与Stevens, 2019b）。 所有实验操纵均采用被试间设计，且所有参与者在整个实验过程中保持其初始随机分配的角色。关于审计市场设置的详细描述与讨论（含均衡预测），详见Blay等人（2019b）。本实验采用与Blay等人（2019b）所述审计市场一致的实验参数，但存在三处显著差异： 其一，将错报的惩罚金额从0.05美元提升至0.25美元，以使错报的经济惩罚标准与Blay等人（2019a）保持一致。此举便于将本研究结果与既往研究（Blay等人, 2019a；Schatzberg等人, 2005）进行更直接的对比，同时有助于剖析经济惩罚与报告行为背后的潜在理论机制之间的相互作用。 其二，移除Blay等人（2019b）实验指导手册中包含的实验前测验环节，取而代之的是报告伦理立场问卷（Ethics Position Questionnaire, EPQ，Forsyth, 1980）的结果，该问卷可通过理想主义与相对主义量表衡量个体道德思维的差异。 其三，Blay等人（2019b）采用3×1被试间实验设计，将披露设置为三个操纵水平，具体考察了无披露、仅披露、披露且签署三种情形对审计师错报行为的影响。与之不同，本研究采用2×2被试间实验设计，考察以下四种实验条件：无签署与披露、仅签署、仅披露、签署且披露。我们认为该设计更便于两项研究结果之间的直接对比。除本研究的原始数据外，本次提交的Excel文件还包含一个标注数据说明的工作表。