Replication Data for: Why Compete for Firms?: Electoral Effects of Corporate Headquarters Relocation

Why do local and state governments in the U.S. compete to attract and retain corporations in their jurisdictions even by offering generous incentives, which can jeopardize public spending on other needs? This research shows that the answer can lie in the electoral effects of HQ relocation. Using an original dataset of interstate HQ relocation cases covered in the news media from 1995 to 2015, this research finds that interstate business location decisions affect gubernatorial election outcomes. However, empirical analyses provide evidence that voters use different attribution processes when considering HQ relocation-in versus relocation-out cases: HQ relocation-out results in greater support for Republican candidates, whereas HQ relocation-in increases support for the incumbent party. Supplementary analyses suggest that the perceptual effects and symbolic value of HQ relocation, rather than its immediate local economic effects, drive electoral outcomes. The findings have implications for electoral accountability and the political economy of business-government relationships.为何美国各州及地方政府不惜通过提供优厚激励举措来争夺、挽留辖区内企业，即便此举可能挤占其他领域的公共开支？本研究表明，答案或许藏于总部（HQ）迁移的选举效应之中。本研究依托1995年至2015年间新闻媒体报道的州际总部迁移案例原创数据集，发现跨州企业选址决策会对州长选举结果产生影响。不过，实证分析表明，选民在看待总部迁入与迁出两类案例时，会采用不同的归因逻辑：企业总部迁出会提升选民对共和党候选人的支持率，而总部迁入则会提高选民对执政党的支持度。补充分析显示，驱动选举结果的是总部迁移带来的感知效应与象征价值，而非其直接的本地经济影响。本研究结果对选举问责制以及政企关系的政治经济学研究具有启示意义。