Replication Data for: Same as the Old Boss? Domestic Politics and the Turnover Trap

Leadership turnover brings to office new leaders with private reputational incentives to bluff about their resolve, incentivizing both incumbents and their foreign rivals to take steps that increase the risk of war. Some leader changes, however, are more dangerous than others. The turnover trap arises when there is sufficient uncertainty about a new leader's resolve and expectations of future interactions, and whether those factors coincide depends on how new leaders come to power and the political system in which its turnover occurs. We expect that those instances of leader change most likely to generate turnover traps entail (1) democratic incumbents unconnected to their predecessor's support coalition and (2) autocratic incumbents that inherit their predecessors' coalitions. In a sample of strategic rivals from 1918-2007, we find that the probability of dispute escalation declines over leaders' tenure, but only for the two types of turnover we identify as most dangerous.领导权更迭（Leadership turnover）会催生新领导者上台，这类新领导者出于私人声誉层面的激励动机，会在自身执政决心方面虚张声势；该情形会诱使现任执政者及其外国对手采取各类举措，进而抬升战争爆发风险。然而，并非所有领导者更迭的风险程度都一致，部分政权交接的危害性远甚于其他情形。当新领导者的执政决心、未来互动预期均存在显著不确定性时，便会滋生领导权更迭陷阱；而这两类不确定性是否会同时出现，取决于新领导者的上台路径，以及其政权更迭发生时所处的政治体制。我们推断，最有可能引发领导权更迭陷阱的领导者更迭情形包含两类：其一为脱离前任执政支持联盟的民主制现任执政者，其二为继承前任执政联盟的威权制现任执政者。在1918年至2007年的战略对手样本中，我们发现：争端升级的概率会随领导者任期延长而降低，但这一规律仅适用于我们此前界定的两类高风险领导权更迭情形。