Trends and crisis in Germany 1924-1934. Domestic economy situation and foreign indebtedness.

Why suffered Germany a crisis of unprecedented scale after a promising stabilization of the Mark in 1923/24 and the subsequent increase, and which factors are linked to the disaster?The study ties in with one of the most controversy in the German economic history of the last decades. In the so-called ‘Borchardt controversy’ the researcher Knut Borchardt questioned the traditional interpretation of the seriousness of the global economic crisis of 1929. The usual interpretation was that the depression and finally the following establishment of the Nazi - regime was due by unforced errors in the economic policies of the last Weimar governments, especially the ‘Brüning deflation policy’. This Keynesian-influenced interpretation was opposed by Borchardts supply side inspired view that even before the global economic crisis the German economy had been sick and that the deflation and a balanced budget policy of Bruning resulted from a dilemma. A central objection to Borchard’s interpretation was the question, why only a year after Bruning´s resignation a dramatic shift to an expansionary monetary and fiscal policies could be initiated.
A new interpretation of Brünings deflationary policy is presented in shifting the focal point of criticism of the German economic policy in the period of the ‘Dawes-Plan’. This new focus of criticism leads to a new interpretation of the Borchardt-theses on German’s economic policy in recent years of the Weimar Republic. Germany’s undamped foreign indebtedness since 1924 plays a key role in explaining Germany’s crisis and economic situation between the Dawes-Plan and the transfer stop.
The central thesis of the investigation is: “The interdependence between Reparation payments and Germany’s economic trend is the lack of stimulus compatibility of the different reparationregimes. There was no reparation arrangement before the Young Plan fo 1929/30, which gave the German side an incentive for a net transfer of resources. Germany underwent systematical the reparation transfer of the Dawes plan by massive foreign indebtedness. The previous impacts of the German balance of payment by foreign debt contributed causative to the heaviness of Germany’s crisis.” (see: Ritschl, A., 2002: Deutschlands Krise und Konjunktur 1924-1934. Berlin: Akademie Verlag, S. 17). In Ritschl’s opinion the reparations has not been disastrous for the German development. But fateful German attempt to deny reparation payments with maneuvers, leads to Germany’s crisis in the interwar period.

Datatables in HISTAT:

A-Tables: Data of the German Empire’s budget and of the public sector as a whole.
B-Tables: Draft of a national accounting for the years 1925 to 1938 (social product and it’s components).
C-Tables: Quarterly interpolation of further timeseries (e.g. paid employment)

Topics of the Study:
- The Empire’s revenues by financial years (Mio. RM)
- Job creation bills of exchange and armor bills of exchange by financial years (Mio. RM)
- Net borrowing of the German Empire by financial years (Mio. RM)
- Interest payments on the debt of the German Empire by financial years (Mio. RM)
- Expenses, revenues and deficit of the German Empire by financial years (Mio. RM)
- Quarterly revenues and expenses of the German Empire.
- Quarterly circulation of job creation bills of exchange.
- Estimated quarterly interest and principal payment of the German Empire.
- Expenses and revenues of the German Empire by calendar years.
- Expenses and revenues of German states and municipalities by financial years.
- Expenses and revenues of the public sector by calendar years.
- National income 1913 and 1925 to 1938.
- Reallocation of the national income.
- Aggregated investments.
- Balance of payment.
- Expenditure side of the social product.
- Foreign trade.
- Public and privat consum.
- Use of social product.
- Paid employment.

Territory of investigation: Germany in the borders of Weimar Republic, 1924 – 1934.

Survey Method, used sources:
- Unpublished archival sources
(Federal Archive in Koblenz und Potsdam, Main-Archive of the German Federal Bank (Deutsche Bundesbank),
Archive of the Institute for Contemporary History IfZ, Munich.)
- Published sources
(files of the Reich Chancellery, AdR; proceedings of the Reichstag, 5th term, vol. 448, 456;
Foreign Relations of the United States, FRUS, born 1931)
- Official Statistics
- Other literature (selected scientific publications).

1923/1924年德国马克实现稳健企稳且后续汇率回升后，德国为何爆发了史无前例规模的危机？这场灾难的关联影响因素有哪些？
本研究关联近数十年来德国经济史上最具争议的议题之一。在所谓的「博尔查特之争（Borchardt controversy）中，学者克努特·博尔查特（Knut Borchardt）对1929年全球经济危机严重性的传统解读提出了质疑。主流解读认为，大萧条乃至后续纳粹政权的建立，源于魏玛共和国（Weimar Republic）末期各届政府的经济政策失误——尤其是「布吕宁通货紧缩政策」——所致。这一受凯恩斯主义影响的解读遭到了博尔查特的供给侧视角所反对，博尔查特认为，即便在全球经济危机爆发前，德国经济就已积弊深重，布吕宁的通货紧缩与平衡预算政策实则源于两难困境。针对博尔查特解读的核心质疑在于：为何布吕宁辞职仅一年后，德国就能大幅转向扩张性货币与财政政策？

本研究通过将批评焦点转向「道威斯计划（Dawes-Plan）时期的德国经济政策，为布吕宁的通货紧缩政策提出了全新解读。这一新的批评视角，为魏玛共和国末期德国经济政策的博尔查特论题提供了新阐释。1924年以来德国持续高企的外债，是解释道威斯计划至赔款转移中止期间德国危机与经济状况的关键因素。

本研究的核心论题如下："赔款支付与德国经济走势之间的关联，在于不同赔款机制缺乏激励相容性。在1929/1930年的杨计划（Young Plan）之前，没有任何赔款安排能够激励德国方面实现资源的净转移。德国通过大规模举借外债系统性地承担了道威斯计划下的赔款转移义务。德国因外债形成的国际收支前置影响，是德国危机加重的因果性诱因。"（资料来源：里茨尔（Ritschl, A.），2002：《1924-1934年德国的危机与景气》，柏林： Akademie Verlag，第17页。）里茨尔认为，赔款本身并未对德国的发展造成灾难性影响，但德国试图通过各种手段逃避赔款支付的致命尝试，最终引发了两次世界大战间期的德国危机。

### HISTAT 数据集表：
- A表：德意志帝国整体预算及公共部门整体数据。
- B表：1925年至1938年国民核算草案（含社会总产品及其构成项）。
- C表：其余时间序列的季度插值数据（如有偿就业数据）。

### 本研究涉及主题：
- 按财政年度统计的帝国财政收入（单位：百万帝国马克（Mio. RM））
- 按财政年度统计的就业创汇汇票与军工汇票（单位：百万帝国马克）
- 按财政年度统计的德意志帝国净举债规模（单位：百万帝国马克）
- 按财政年度统计的德意志帝国债务利息支出（单位：百万帝国马克）
- 按财政年度统计的德意志帝国支出、收入与财政赤字（单位：百万帝国马克）
- 德意志帝国季度收支数据
- 就业创汇汇票季度流通量
- 德意志帝国季度估算利息与本金偿付额
- 按日历年度统计的德意志帝国收支数据
- 按财政年度统计的德国各邦及自治市收支数据
- 按日历年度统计的公共部门收支数据
- 1913年及1925年至1938年国民收入数据
- 国民收入再分配数据
- 总投资数据
- 国际收支数据
- 社会总产品支出端数据
- 对外贸易数据
- 公共与私人消费数据
- 社会总产品使用情况数据
- 有偿就业数据

### 研究范围：
1924年至1934年魏玛共和国（Weimar Republic）边界内的德国领土。

### 研究方法与使用数据源：
- 未公开档案资料
（科布伦茨与波茨坦联邦档案馆、德意志联邦银行（Deutsche Bundesbank）总档案馆、慕尼黑当代史研究所（IfZ）档案馆）
- 已出版资料
（帝国总理府档案（AdR）、第五届帝国议会会议记录，第448、456卷；《美国外交关系（FRUS）》，1931年版）
- 官方统计数据
- 其他文献（精选学术出版物）