Replication Data for: Family Ties, Social Control, and Authoritarian Distribution to Elites

Authoritarian survival theories maintain that dictators distribute rents to elites who can control the masses. Yet, it is unclear how dictators choose beneficiary elites. We argue that elites centrally placed in their locality's family network enjoy greater influence on other community members and, thus, are more likely to be co-opted through distribution. We test this argument by compiling a novel dataset of Paraguayan family networks that we link to families who illegally benefited from public land grants from 1954 to 2007. Using a difference-in-differences in reverse design, we find that local families with higher network centrality were more likely to receive these grants during the 1954-1988 dictatorship. We also show more affiliations with the ruling Colorado Party and incidents of repression––indicators of social control––in localities with more central families before 1989. Our work shows that family ties can serve to build authoritarian ruling coalitions.