Replication Data for: Selective Bribery: When Do Citizens Engage in Corruption?

Corruption often persists not only because public officials take bribes, but also because many citizens are willing to pay them. Yet even in countries with endemic corruption, few people always pay bribes. Why do citizens bribe in some situations but not in others? Integrating insights from both principal-agent and collective action approaches to the study of corruption, we develop and empirically evaluate an analytical framework for understanding selective bribery. Our framework reveals how citizens' motivations, costs, and risks influence their willingness to engage in corruption. A conjoint experiment conducted in Ukraine in 2020 predominantly corroborates our pre-registered predictions. By shedding light on conditions that dampen citizens' readiness to pay bribes, our findings offer insights into the types of institutional reforms that may reduce corruption and ultimately help countries to escape self-reinforcing corruption cycles.