Юридичні конструкції у фокусі інтертемпорального та інтерлокального методів порівняння: методологічний аспект

The article develops a constructivist philosophy of comparative law, focusing on how legal constructions mediate intertemporal and interlocal comparison within the European private law tradition. It examines comparative law as a specific mode of legal thought that connects historical (intertemporal) and spatial (interlocal) comparison through the category of legal construction. The article argues that meaningful comparison of legal orders requires identifying stable constructions (such as ownership, contract, obligation, succession) that serve as the tertium comparationis, rather than merely juxtaposing positive norms. The author distinguishes between comparison “in time” (Roman law – ius commune – modern codifications) and comparison “in space” (between contemporary legal systems), contending that both should be grounded in an analysis of how particular constructions evolve and are transplanted. Functionalism, path dependence, and transplant theory are critically reassessed, with the conclusion that they remain incomplete unless anchored in the structural logic of constructions that actually carry legal meaning across contexts. Special attention is given to the Western legal tradition, where Roman law constructions became universal tools for organizing private law material and were later reconfigured by codifications and European projects such as the Common Core of European Private Law. The article demonstrates that receptions and transplants operate not at the level of isolated rules, but at the level of constructions, which accounts for both the persistence of Roman matrices and the limits of borrowing across different legal cultures. Legal constructions are defined as structured complexes that precede and organize normative material, enabling different legal systems to produce comparable solutions within divergent doctrinal languages. Because constructions connect ratio iuris (legal reasoning) with ratio facti (social reality), they offer a more suitable tertium comparationis than abstract “functions” or mere institutional labels. The article concludes that comparative law should be understood as a philosophical and methodological endeavour focused on reconstructing and comparing legal constructions, rather than as a purely technical inventory of similarities and differences. This constructivist approach enables an explanation of why certain borrowings succeed or fail, how legal systems remain open yet preserve their identity, and how a common European private-law space can develop without erasing historical diversity.