Replication data for: Rewarding Bad Behavior: How Governments Respond to Terrorism in Civil War

Dissident groups often use terrorism as a means to achieve their political aims. To determine whether the tactic is effective, recent studies examine whether organizations using terrorism gain concessions on their demands and find, most often, they do not. These studies, however, overlook other important markers of success, specifically whether groups are invited to participate in negotiations as a result of their use of terrorism. Extant studies also conduct statistical tests on overly aggregated data that masks any effect terrorism has on outcomes in bargaining. Using new monthly dyadic data on the incidence of negotiations and the number of concessions offered to groups involved in African civil wars, this paper demonstrates that groups using more terrorism are more likely to be granted the opportunity to participate in negotiations. States are also likely to grant more concessions to groups when they execute a greater number of terror attacks in civil war.