Replication Data for: The Role of Foreign Aid in Procuring Civil War Party Consent to Peacekeeping

The success of peacekeeping operations relies heavily on the conflict parties providing unrestricted consent to the intervention: accepting the mission without restricting its operational mandate. Consent is, however, often withheld or limited by one or more parties who calculate a higher cost to peace than to continued fighting. We highlight the role of international economic incentives in the form of foreign development aid in overcoming crucial hurdles to the provision of unrestricted consent. We argue that past foreign aid sends a credible signal of future, post-conflict material benefits to be obtained by the belligerents \emph{if} they work toward peace. This conditionality of future benefits not only helps overcome credible commitment hurdles but also incentivizes the belligerents to take steps toward an effective transition to peace and stability, including providing unrestricted consent to peacekeeping missions. Analyses of up to 119 post-Cold War civil wars and a brief narrative of peacekeeping operations during East Timor's transition to independence demonstrate that international incentives in the form of foreign aid significantly and substantially increase the likelihood of unrestricted consent from all conflict parties. The findings have implications for the literature on international influences on domestic political contestation and for research on the prospects of successful peacekeeping operations. The study also suggests that incentives based on development-oriented aid can facilitate the type of peacekeeping operations that are most likely to enhance human security.