Replication Data for: Rebel Group Substitutes and Peace Agreement Amnesties

Why do governments grant amnesties to rebels after civil wars? Scholars argue that governments use amnesties to signal commitment to peace or prevent spoiling by rebel leaders. However, other reforms are stronger signals of commitment than amnesties and rebel leaders are almost never prosecuted following peace agreements, with or without amnesty. Thus, amnesties do not prevent leaders from undermining the peace. Instead, I argue amnesties protect rank and file rebels from post-war prosecution. When rebel foot soldiers could join another group, they can use the threat of exit to force their leaders to negotiate amnesties and ensure they are implemented. Using data on peace agreement provisions and implementation, coupled with a new measure of substitute rebel groups, I show that governments grant amnesties when faced with multiple similar rebel groups. Finally, I find that implementing amnesties prevents war recurrence when there are substitute groups but does nothing without them.内战结束后，各国政府为何会向叛乱者实施大赦？学界普遍认为，政府推行大赦是为了传递和平承诺，或是防止叛乱领导人破坏和平进程。然而，相较于大赦，其他改革举措能更强有力地传递和平承诺；且无论是否实施大赦，和平协定达成后叛乱领导人几乎都不会被起诉。因此，大赦并无法阻止领导人破坏和平。与此相反，本文认为大赦的核心作用是保护叛乱群体中的普通成员免受战后起诉。当叛乱的基层士兵可以投奔其他叛乱团体时，他们可借助脱离当前团体的威胁，迫使己方领导人谈判争取大赦，并确保大赦得到落实。本文依托和平协定条款与执行情况的相关数据，结合一项全新的替代叛乱团体衡量指标，研究发现：当政府面临多个类似的叛乱团体时，会选择实施大赦。最后，本文还发现：在存在替代型叛乱团体的情况下，落实大赦可有效防止战争复发；而在缺乏此类团体时，大赦则无法发挥任何作用。