Replication Data for: An Experimental Test of the Effects of Fear in a Coordination Game

Cognitive appraisal theory predicts that emotions affects participation decisions around risky collective action. However, little existing research has attempted to parse out various mechanisms by which this process occurs. We build a global game of regime change and discuss the effects that fear may have on participation through pessimism about the state of the world, other players' willingness to participate, and risk aversion. We test the behavioral effects of fear in this game by conducting 32 sessions of an experiment in two labs where participants are randomly assigned to an emotion induction procedure. In some rounds of the game, potential mechanisms are shut down to parse their contribution to the overall effect of fear. Our results show that in this context fear does not affect willingness to participate. This finding highlights the importance of context, including integral versus incidental emotions and the size of the stakes, in shaping their effects.