Replication Data for: How to Promote Order and Property Rights under Weak Rule of Law? An Experiment in Changing Dispute Resolution Behavior through Community Education

Dispute resolution institutions facilitate agreements and preserve the peace whenever property rights are imperfect. In weak states, strengthening formal institutions can take decades, and so state and aid interventions also try to shape informal practices and norms governing disputes. Their goal is to improve bargaining and commitment, thus limiting disputes and violence. Mass education campaigns that promote alternative dispute resolution (ADR) are common examples of these interventions. We studied the short-term impacts of one such campaign in Liberia, where property disputes are endemic. Residents of 86 of 246 towns randomly received training in ADR practices and norms; this training reached 15% of adults. One year later, treated towns had higher resolution of land disputes and lower violence. Impacts spilled over to untrained residents. We also saw unintended consequences: more extrajudicial punishment and (weakly) more nonviolent disagreements. Results imply that mass education can change high-stakes behaviors, and improving informal bargaining and enforcement behavior can promote order in weak states.当产权界定不完备时，纠纷解决机构可促成协议达成、维护社会秩序。在弱势国家中，强化正式制度往往需要数十年时间，因此各国政府与援助机构的干预举措也会尝试塑造规范纠纷的非正式实践与准则。此类干预的目标在于优化议价与承诺机制，从而减少纠纷与暴力事件。推广替代性纠纷解决（Alternative Dispute Resolution, ADR）的大众教育活动，便是这类干预举措的常见范例。我们针对利比里亚的一场此类教育活动展开了研究——该国的产权纠纷问题长期频发。研究团队在246个城镇中随机选取86个，为当地居民开展ADR实践与准则培训，覆盖了当地15%的成年人口。一年后，接受培训的城镇土地纠纷解决率更高，暴力事件发生率更低。干预效果还溢出至未接受培训的居民群体。同时我们也观察到了意外后果：当地出现了更多法外惩处行为，以及（程度较弱的）非暴力纠纷增多的情况。研究结果表明，大众教育能够改变高风险行为，而优化非正式议价与执行机制，可助力弱势国家维系社会秩序。