Do Political Finance Reforms Really Reduce Corruption? A Replication Study

In their 2021 article published in the British Journal of Political Science, Calla Hummel, John Gerring, and Thomas Burt (henceforth Hummel et al.) examine the relationship between political finance reforms and corruption, concluding that state funding of political parties reduces corruption by diminishing reliance on private financing. Our replication study challenges this conclusion based on data accuracy and operationalisation issues of their key explanatory variable – Political Finance Subsidy Index (PFSI) – and using alternative model specifications and regional subsamples. While our partial data corrections and recoding do not significantly differ from the Hummel et al. findings, the substantial regional heterogeneity regarding public party funding – corruption relationship and the results’ sensitivity to alternative modelling choices such as two-way fixed effects, country fixed effects, and time fixed effects, cast doubt on the reliability of their results. Our findings underscore the methodological challenges in assessing the effects of public funding reforms and emphasize the need for refined measurements and careful consideration of regional contexts. Although public funding may help combat corruption under specific institutional conditions, its effects are not universally consistent, calling for greater caution in deriving policy implications from cross-national analyses.