Replication data for: Greater Expectations: A Field Experiment to Improve Accountability in Mali

In the paper for which I use this data, I argue that if citizens systematically underestimate what their government can and should do for them, then they will hold politicians to a lower standard and sanction poor performers less often. A field experiment across 95 localities in Mali in which randomly assigned localities receive a civics course identifies the effect of raising voter expectations of government on their willingness to hold leaders accountable. The course provides information about local government capacity and responsibility as well as how local politicians perform relative to others, effectively raising voter expectations of what local governments can and should do. Survey experiments among individuals in treated and control communities (N=5,560) suggest that people in treated villages are indeed more likely to sanction poor performers and vote based on performance more often. A behavioral outcome – the likelihood that villagers challenge local leaders at a town hall meeting – adds external validity to survey findings.在使用本数据集的研究论文中，笔者提出如下论断：若公民系统性低估本国政府能够且应当为其提供的公共服务，则其将以更低标准评判政客，且更少制裁履职不力的官员。本研究在马里95个行政区域开展田野实验，将实验区域随机分为两组，其中一组接受公民素养课程干预。该实验旨在识别提升选民对政府的预期对其监督领导者履职意愿所产生的因果效应。该课程向民众普及地方政府的履职权限与责任范畴，以及本地政客相较于其他地区同行的施政表现，有效提升了选民对地方政府能力与职责的预期。对干预组与对照组社区居民开展的调查实验（样本量N=5560）结果显示，干预组村庄的居民确实更倾向于制裁履职不力的官员，且更倾向于依据施政表现进行投票。一项行为结果指标——村民在市政会议上质疑地方领导者的概率——进一步验证了调查发现的外部效度。