Replication Data for: Negotiating under political uncertainty: national elections and the dynamics of international cooperation

This article explores if and how national elections affect the chances of concluding an international agreement. Drawing on a literature on the informational efficiency of elections, we are interested in how political uncertainty in the run up to an election impacts the dynamics of international negotiations. Using the case of decision-making in the European Union (EU), we find that pending national elections significantly reduce the chances of reaching an agreement at the international level, that this effect is strongest during close elections with uncertain outcomes, and that it is particularly pronounced in the case of elections in larger member states. Our findings highlight the fruitfulness of further research into the dynamics between national and international politics. The article has positive and normative implications for the literature on two-level games, international negotiations, and legislative bargaining in the EU.本文旨在探讨全国选举是否以及如何影响国际协定的达成概率。依托选举信息效率领域的既有研究文献，本文聚焦选举筹备阶段的政治不确定性对国际谈判动态的影响机制。本研究以欧盟（European Union, EU）的决策实践为案例，得出以下结论：即将举行的全国选举会显著降低国际层面达成协定的可能性；该效应在结果存在不确定性的势均力敌的选举中最为突出；且在规模较大的成员国举行选举时，该效应表现得尤为显著。本研究结果凸显了进一步探究国内政治与国际政治互动动态的学术价值与研究潜力。本文对双层博弈、国际谈判以及欧盟立法博弈相关研究领域，兼具实证与规范层面的理论贡献。