Rewards for Ratification: Payoffs for Participating in the International Human Rights Regime?

Among the explanations for state ratification of human rights treaties, few are more common and widely accepted than the conjecture that states are rewarded for ratification by other states. These rewards are expected to come in the form of tangible benefits—foreign aid, trade, and investment—and intangible benefits such as praise, acceptance, and legitimacy. Surprisingly, these explanations for ratification have never been tested empirically. We summarize and clarify the theoretical underpinnings of “reward-for-ratification” theories and test these propositions empirically by looking for increased international aid, economic agreements, and public praise and recognition following ratification of four prominent human rights treaties. We find almost no evidence that states can expect increased tangible or intangible rewards after ratification. Given the lack of empirical support, alternative explanations seem more appealing for understanding human rights treaty ratification.在国家批准人权条约的各类主流解释中，“国家因批准人权条约而获得其他国家回报”这一推测，是最为普遍且广受认可的论点之一。此类回报预期将以两类形式呈现：一是有形收益，包括对外援助、贸易往来与投资；二是无形收益，如赞誉、接纳与合法性赋予。令人讶异的是，这类针对条约批准行为的解释从未得到过实证检验。我们对“批准获酬”理论的理论根基进行了梳理与阐明，并通过考察四项重要人权条约获得批准后，受援国的国际援助、经济协定以及公开赞誉与认可是否有所提升，对这些理论命题展开了实证检验。研究结果显示，几乎没有证据表明国家在批准人权条约后，能够期待获得更多有形或无形回报。鉴于现有实证支撑的缺失，其他解释路径似乎更能合理阐释人权条约批准行为的动因。