Replication Data for: Do International Bureaucrats Matter? Evidence from the International Monetary Fund

Scholars of international cooperation argue that member states delegate decision making authority to international organizations (IOs) -- and by implication the bureaucrats who staff them -- as a commitment to non-interference. Yet others question the credibility of this delegation, arguing that institutions simply reflect the interests of powerful member states. We test the credibility of delegation within the International Monetary Fund (IMF) using event study methods. We estimate the abnormal returns to sovereign bond risk premia following the announcement of new, high-level staff appointments at the IMF. Staff announcements result in statistically significant shifts in risk premia supporting the credibility of delegation. These shifts are robust to diverse specifications and alternative estimation strategies. Abnormal returns are higher - implying greater risk - for bureaucrats who implement more stringent loan conditionality once in office and for appointees holding a Ph.D. in economics. Abnormal returns are lower for appointees hailing from global south.