Data for: An experiment on the causes of bank run contagions

Abstract of associated article: To understand the mechanisms behind bank run contagions, we conduct bank run experiments in a modified Diamond–Dybvig setup with two banks (Left and Right). The banks׳ liquidity levels are either linked or independent. Left Bank depositors see their bank׳s liquidity level before deciding. Right Bank depositors only see Left Bank withdrawals before deciding. We find that Left Bank depositors׳ actions significantly affect Right Bank depositors׳ behavior, even when liquidities are independent. Furthermore, a panic may be a one-way street: an increase in Left Bank withdrawals can cause a panic run on the Right Bank, but a decrease does not calm depositors.关联论文摘要：为厘清银行挤兑传染背后的作用机制，我们在包含两家银行（左侧银行与右侧银行）的改良版戴蒙德-迪布维格（Diamond–Dybvig）模型框架下开展银行挤兑实验。两家银行的流动性水平既可以相互关联，也可以彼此独立。左侧银行的储户在做出提款决策前可获知本行的流动性水平，而右侧银行的储户仅能在决策前观察到左侧银行的提款规模。研究结果表明，即便两家银行的流动性相互独立，左侧银行储户的行为仍会对右侧银行储户的决策产生显著影响。此外，恐慌性挤兑可能呈现单向性特征：左侧银行提款规模的上升会引发右侧银行的恐慌性挤兑，而提款规模的下降却无法平复储户的恐慌情绪。