Replication Data for: Military Defection During Localized Protests: The Case of Tataouine

In May 2017, the Tunisian military allowed protesters to storm and shut down an oil valve in Tataouine, in contravention of a direct order from President Essebsi to defend the production site. While scholars have recently examined military defection during mass uprisings, these protests were small and localized. Why did the military disobey President Essebsi in Tataouine? Drawing upon a survey of military officers conducted six months prior to the defection, I show that the military's composition and corporate interests, rather than its professionalism, likely prompted its defection. The majority of the military hails from impoverished regions in Tunisia's neglected interior and identifies with the demands of protesters in these regions. The military also saw the curtailment of its material and political interests in early 2017, giving it little incentive to repress protesters on the regime's behalf. Methodologically, this study provides some of the first survey data of military officers’ attitudes toward defection.2017年5月，突尼斯军方允许抗议者冲击并关停了塔塔乌因（Tataouine）的一处石油阀门，此举违反了总统埃塞西（Essebsi）下达的保卫该生产场地的直接命令。尽管近期已有学者针对大规模民众起义期间的军方叛逃行为展开研究，但此次抗议规模较小且具有地域性局限。为何军方会在塔塔乌因地区违抗埃塞西总统的命令？本研究借助叛逃发生前六个月开展的军方军官问卷调查数据，证实军方的人员构成与集体利益，而非其职业操守，很可能是促使其叛逃的核心动因。军方绝大多数成员来自突尼斯被长期忽视的内陆贫困地区，与这些地区抗议者的诉求存在身份共鸣。此外，军方在2017年初遭遇了物质与政治利益的缩减，这使其几乎没有动机为政权镇压抗议者。在方法论层面，本研究提供了首批针对军方军官叛逃态度的调查数据中的一部分。